Author: Manu Steens
In this contribution I write my own opinion, not that of any organization
Definition of risk
Anyone who takes himself seriously concerning risk management knows that the definition of risk according to ISO roughly amounts to a cause that gives rise to an uncertainty in the achievement of objectives. That uncertainty can have a de facto positive effect, so that one achieves the objectives and more. Or have a negative effect, and not achieve the objectives or worse.
One can write a risk can then as a risk statement. This consists of a cause, the actual risk and the ultimate effect. This suffices as a one-to-one cause-to-effect statement to follow our reasoning. Although real risk statements can give rise to many-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many statements.
Having a negative effect is due to threats, having a positive effect is due to opportunities.
Since most people link a risk, to threats rather than opportunities, we need to use metalanguage to focus.
Metalanguage to focus
One can include risk statements, including opportunity statements, in these metalanguage ‘templates’.
This one is based on the principle of a risk statement:
- “As a result of , may occur, which may lead to .”
And for opportunities based on SWOT, this becomes:
- “Because we have , we can create or exploit , which would lead to .”
- “If we remove or adapt a to , which might allow us to create or exploit , this could lead to .”
Meta language applied to Covid-19
If we apply this to the European situation regarding Covid-19, we get, for example, statements like:
- Through a policy culture that allows for a firm response, we can limit a new flare-up of the virus. That gives the development of a suitable virus vaccine more time and thus more chance of success.
- If we can limit the number of human contacts at work, on public transport and in public spaces and to the extent of the realistically possible also in private life and at all kinds of events, we may be able to reduce the virus sufficiently, which gives a chance to the world of making work of economic recovery.
- If one restrains the global expansion of human activities intelligently, allowing the pandemic risk in the future to diminish, biodiversity can stabilize, the natural balance can restore, fewer people come into contact with wild animals. These are no longer dislodged from their habitat. So one no longer transfers new pathogens, transmission can decrease internationally. Then citizens in the future will be more forgiving and tolerant of a mistake in policy.
- If one would use clear communication, and hears the right experts. If one creates transparency about the relationship between cause and effect. Then one can discuss most decisive policies in open forums, providing insight into necessary and perhaps sufficient reforms to support a sustainable recovery.
- With this premise, there may possibly be brought forward new and better institutions, with improved basic infrastructure. And with better regulation of key economic sectors and investment in public services that create and protect human capital. And that render in the long term, not in the short term, which can shape the economy and the world of the future. For example, by opting for a low-carbon basic infrastructure as a result of an open debate without group-think or tunnel vision , which enables growth for new developments, but which can also provide an answer to climate challenges.
- By organizing flexible technology in Europe, and building strategic stocks of raw materials, it is possible to switch quickly between conventional production and the production of necessary goods in a pandemic time (e.g. personal protective equipment), thus reducing Europe’s dependence on Asia, and which also makes it possible to test such a system in collaboration with regular customers (eg hospitals, rest homes,…).