Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots, coups)

Intrastate violence (civil strikes, riots, coups)
Intra-state violence (civil strikes, riots, coups) : Destructive behavior, interpersonal violence and/or use of force that occurs within a country or community, by state or non-state actors. Includes, but is not limited to: internal civil unrest manifested as violent riots and strikes; gang violence; mass shootings; civil wars; guerrilla wars; genocide; assassinations; and coups.   The question in this article is what risks Intrastate violence poses. To this end, I look at this phenomenon from a social point of view. The question thus becomes, “What are the social implications of intrastate violence for developing countries and what are the global implications?In this text I write in my own title, not that of any organization. The 2024 Global Risk Report – WEF gives this definition (quotes from documents have been translated with a translation program)
Author: Manu Steens

Summary: Intrastate violence and its social risks

Intrastate violence poses a complex threat to communities, with state weakness fueling conflict and corruption. The consequences are far-reaching: economic dislocation, capital flight and infrastructure destruction disrupt the fabric of society. Women and girls are usually the biggest victims of these situations of violence.

Flows of refugees often exacerbate issues, resulting in potential conflict. The easy proliferation of weapons also increases the risk that violence will be seen as the solution. Although international security is threatened by arms trade and its link to terror, the economy ultimately offers prospects for peacebuilding and recovery.

Social implications for developing countries:

I divide the impacts into direct social impacts, economic and development impacts, and political-administrative impacts.

Direct social impact:

A first, perhaps most important consequence for those on the streets, is the disruption of communities and social connections. Much scholarly work has been done in recent years to study the social legacies of armed conflict. Charlotte Fiedler in her analytical essay “What Do We Know about How Armed Conflict Affects Social Cohesion? A Review of the Empirical Literature‘ strongly doubts the initial optimism expressed by some scholars that conflict increases social cohesion.

Trauma

This disruption of communities does not stand alone. Intrastate violence brings, almost naturally, trauma and psychological impact on the population. Indeed, as far as “public health” is concerned, the human response to psychological trauma is one of the most important problems worldwide. An important insight from Vincent J Felitti, Robert F Anda, Dale Nordenberg, David F Williamson, Alison M Spitz, Valerie Edwards, Mary P Koss, James S Marks, is that it is not only PTSD that matters.

Individuals with a history of severe child maltreatment were at 4 to 12 times greater risk of developing alcoholism, depression, substance abuse and suicide attempts, 2 to 4 times greater risk of smoking, >50 sex partners and sexually transmitted diseases, 1.4 to 1.6 times greater risk of physical inactivity and obesity, and 1.6 to 2.9 times greater risk of ischemic heart disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, skeletal fractures, hepatitis, stroke, diabetes and liver disease.

An almost logical psychological consequence with social implications is the loss of trust in institutions and government. In their article “Local institutional quality and conflict violence in Africa,” the authors state “We argue that the quality of local institutions affects conflict risk through two main channels: by shaping the motivations that give rise to violence, and by functioning as opportunity structures that can facilitate or mitigate conflict.

Crime

Furthermore, there are the significant effects of increased crime and lawlessness that can result from the foregoing. Even in the period following the violence, there is still increased crime.

In their article “War and Postwar Violence” in volume 47 of “Crime and Justice – A Review of Research,” Rosemary Gartner and Liam Kennedy state: “Preventing or reducing increased rates of violence after wars is rarely a priority during peace negotiations. As a result, policies instituted as part of the peace process often fuel violent crime.’

Mutatis mutandis, the International Labor Office states in their “Training manual for use by trade union organizations” “Prevention and Resolution of Violent and Armed Conflicts” : “the failure of the state to fulfill its administrative role and the existence of zones of lawlessness provide fertile ground for the spread of illicit activities such as drug and arms trafficking or the recruitment of youth by rebel armies (child soldiers).

Economic and development impacts:

Lost generations

Perhaps the most important longer-term effects here are educational disruption and so-called “lost generations”. In her article ‘How Does Violent Conflict Impact on Individual Educational Outcomes? The Evidence So Far‘ Patricia Justino writes that “Three main themes emerge from empirical research: 1. Relatively small shocks to access to education can lead to significant and long-lasting harmful effects on individual human capital formation in terms of educational achievement, health outcomes and labor market opportunities. 2. Destruction of infrastructure, lack of teachers, and reductions in school capacity disproportionately affect secondary education. 3. Household exposure to violence results in significant gender differences in individual educational outcomes.”. In the World Bank’s essay “Reshaping the Future – Education and Postconflict Reconstruction,” we find : “Education that helps build resilience to conflict is an important strategy for reducing the risk of relapse into violent conflict.”

Capital flight

There is also the classic economic fear reaction: capital flight. The money displaced by capital flight is actually much needed in the country that falls prey to (civil) war. Victor A.B. Davies, in his article ‘Capital Flight And Violent Conflict – A Review Of The Literature‘ of the World Development Report 2011 – Background Note, therefore, rightly asks the question “That violent conflict increases capital flight begs the question: What policies could bring about the return of fled capital after a war?” A low inflation rate could be a small part of the answer, the author suggests. [Davies, Victor A.B.. 2011. Capital Flight and Violent Conflict-A Review of the Literature. © Washington, DC: World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/9056 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”]

Destruction

One of the killers of the economy is the destruction of infrastructure. International humanitarian law and policy in their blog on “Urban warfare and violence” mentions, “In urban fighting, critical infrastructure needed to provide vital services, such as electricity, water and sanitation, health care, food and education, is often destroyed or damaged.”

Brain drain

Brain drain through emigration of highly educated people is a major consequence of violence. In her blog on Investopedia “Brain Drain: Definition, Causes, Effects, and Examples,” Julie Young states: “War and conflict are major catalysts for brain drain. This became clear after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.” (Although the war in Ukraine is not a pure example of intrastate violence, I wish to mention it here.) In addition, as one of the key takeways, she states, “One of the best ways to combat brain drain is to increase public investment in the local economy.”

A quasi direct consequence of violence, poorer education conditions and infrastructure destruction is the reduction of foreign investment.

Administrative impact:

State weakness

Weakening of state institutions by intrastate violence seems obvious. However, the reverse can also happen. In their paper “Weak States And Political Violence In Sub-Saharan Africa” by Matthew F. Kirwin and Wonbin Cho, the authors state, “According to some observers, it is state weakness that has caused violent conflicts such as those in Africa to arise.” In their paper, they examine six hypotheses:

  • H1: The greater the presence of the state in an individual’s life, the less likely the individual is to engage in violent acts.
  • H2: Individuals who feel a general lack of security are more likely to participate in violence.
  • H3: Individuals who feel unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of the state are more likely to participate in violence.
  • H4: Individuals who believe the state satisfactorily provides public services with state resources are less likely to participate in political violence.
  • H5: Individuals who doubt the state’s ability to protect their private property are more likely to participate in violence.
  • H6: Individuals who are members of an ethnic group that they (respondents) feel are treated unfairly by the government are more likely to participate in violence.

Four of these six “dimensions” of a weak state have significant effects on popular attitudes about the acceptability of violence. However, the first hypothesis has not been strongly confirmed and hypothesis four is not defensible according to their research.

Corruption

With a weakening of the state due to intrastate violence, you can also expect an increase in corruption. In his 2021 blog ‘Why war and corruption are inseparable‘ on TRT World, Murat Sofuoglu quotes Mr. Joseph Siegle as follows: ‘”There is a very strong link between corruption and war. Half of the countries in the bottom quartile of Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index are in conflict. This is significantly higher than in any other quartile of countries,’ says Joseph Siegle, Director of Research in Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.’

Failed states

This increases the likelihood of or gives rise to the risk of failed states, or as Robert I Rotberg writes in ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators‘, “Nation-states fail because they are torn apart by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy and the nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.”

He cites Esty et al. who analyzed ethnic wars that led to collapse. The author cites their indicators: “Three strong indicators emerged from their work (out of seventy-five highly relevant variables): failure was likely when a nation-state favored a closed economic system – when openness to international trade was low or nonexistent; when infant mortality rates (a proxy measure of a society’s quality of life) were high, that is, when the ratio of infant mortality per 1,000 live births exceeded the international median; and when a nation-state was undemocratic, because lack of democracy is self-feeding. Esty et al. also concluded that GDP per capita was almost as robust an indicator of failure as infant mortality rates. (Daniel C. Esty et al., “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” paper on the Failed States website, Purdue University (West Lafayette, February 25-27, 1998). https://repository.hkust.edu.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-75208 )

Global implications:

Herein I break down the consequences into the effects of refugee flows, on regional destabilization and on international security.

Streams of refugees:

Migration: a cause?

Refugee flows can be a way in which intrastate violence is “propagated” into conflict across borders. In his 2019 paper ‘Increasing Migration Pressure and Rising Nationalism: Implications for Multilateralism and SDG Implementation‘ at the United Nations, Professor Ashok Swain writes: “Large-scale international migration has several dimensions that can create conflict between the host country and the home country. In certain cases, giving migrants permission to enter one’s own territory can complicate the relationship between the host or transit country and the home country.

The conflict may arise from the exposure of the home state’s inability to manage the migration crisis itself, or the home state may suspect or claim that the receiving or transit country is encouraging migration. This pattern of conflict between sending and receiving countries has recently been observed in the cross-border migration of Congolese and South Sudanese refugees. Uganda hosts the largest number of refugees in Africa and most of them are the product of ethnic conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

This of course produces a separate kind of migratory pressure on neighboring countries that may then themselves become conflicted and fear social tensions in the host country.

Women and girls

Moreover, one of the UNHCR documents puts the impact on women and girls in sharp focus: “War magnifies the everyday injustices that many women live with in peacetime. During periods of armed conflict, all forms of violence increase, especially violence against women and girls. Women forced to flee their homes often become trapped in a vicious cycle of abuse and exposed to sexual exploitation throughout the refugee experience.”

Camps

Currently, many refugees end up in refugee camps. However, humanitarian crises in refugee camps have two potential drawbacks, according to the same document, depending on the camp: “Rebels may also carry out forced recruitment of young men and children or use refugee camps as rest and recovery sites. Many of these problems are exacerbated when refugees spend long periods of time in asylum countries where they lack educational and economic opportunities.”

Regional destabilization:

Costs for nearby regions

Regional economic damage is usually not negligible. For example, in a document written by M Newiak, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) states, “A major consequence of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as elsewhere, is the displacement of populations. This imposes significant economic, fiscal and social costs on the region involved in the conflict, but often also on nearby regions where the displaced reside.”

In two of their three key messages, Hannes Mueller and Julia Tobias in their December 2016 article for the International Growth Centre “The cost of violence: Estimating the economic impact of conflict” also write: “The economic effects of civil war often persist long after the conflict period and can spill over to other countries. These effects include shocks to employment and investment, large outflows of refugees, and reductions in health and education levels. Alleviating the humanitarian crisis and preventing the loss of human capital is important to avoid long-term negative economic consequences.

Rebuilding trust

After conflict, restoring investor confidence and rebuilding trust should be high priorities. One of the main ways conflict can cause economic damage is by affecting investors’ expectations of political risk and the possibility of a future upsurge in violence. Inclusive political institutions can support economic regeneration by preventing the risk of inequality between groups fueling further unrest.”

Arms proliferation

A second issue associated with regional destabilization is arms proliferation. Back in March 1995, Swadesh Rana wrote a research paper on this for UNIDIR in which he stated at the time “There is a constant changing of hands in the small arms market, as one intra-state conflict is over and another is looking for arms. The sale of arms provides money to buy transportation, food, shelter and medical equipment for those who have left the war behind. Easy access to weapons is a disincentive to rely on non-violent means for those who feel disadvantaged and want a change in existing state structures.”

International security:

Terrorism

The United Nations website cites a strong correlation between violence and terror: “Conflict remains the leading cause of terrorism, with more than 99 percent of all terrorist deaths occurring in countries involved in violent conflict or with high levels of political terror. Most deadly attacks occur in the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia.

International crime

Increasing international crime brings responsibilities for legislatures. In the World Bank document, “World Bank. 2020. Violence without Borders: The Internationalization of Crime and Conflict. Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1452-5. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO’, states, “The increasing internationalization of crime and conflict is also reflected in their transnational determinants: … (4) ‘conflict contagion’ via flows of tangible resources across borders (such as weapons, combatants and money) or flows of intangible resources (such as ideas, inspirations and grievances). As political stability and law enforcement are increasingly global public goods, this provides a rationale for greater international assistance to countries facing fiscal and technical constraints that prevent them from providing stability and the rule of law.”

Disruption of trade routes

There is also the international disruption of trade routes, as illustrated in UNCTAD’s February 2024 document, “Navigating Troubled Waters Impact To Global Trade Of Disruption Of Shipping Routes In The Red Sea, Black Sea And Panama Canal. They argue that attacks on shipping such as in the Red Sea are producing an industry response that results in a decline in transits. This reflects the reaction of many shipping companies to the new security threat. Many have chosen to divert ships to alternative routes, particularly around the Cape of Good Hope. Disruptions so affecting international shipping have the potential to alter global maritime networks and the world trade map.

The impact on freight rates varied by market segment, but the strongest increases occurred in container shipping, which carried consumer and industrial goods.

Economics can help

Conversely, in its article “Trading Away from Conflict: Using Trade to Increase Resilience in Fragile States,” the World Bank argues that economics can help against intrastate violence. Two highlights of the article state:

“More and more poor people are living in fragile and conflict-affected countries, and there is new evidence that their trade patterns can affect their situation.

Case studies of Nigeria and the Palestinian territories offer evidence that when trade translates into higher incomes, people are less likely to get involved in conflict.”

However, there is also this comment by them, “Rising prices for exported oil and mineral commodities significantly increase the risk of conflict between countries, but there is hope for policy solutions.” Hopefully the same applies to intra-state violence.

Manu Steens

Manu works at the Flemish Government in risk management and Business Continuity Management. On this website, he shares his own opinions regarding these and related fields.

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