Interstate armed conflict (war, proxy wars)

Interstate armed conflict (war, proxy wars): Bilateral or multilateral use of force between states, manifested as proxy war or open, hot war. The question in this article is what risks Interstate armed conflict poses. To this end, I look at this phenomenon from a social, political and technical standpoint. The question thus becomes, “What are the social, political and technical implications of Interstate armed conflict for Europe and the world? I stick to non-nuclear armed conflict.

In this contribution, I write my own opinion, not that of any organization. The 2024 Global Risk Report – WEF gives this definition (translation of this tekst was done with a translation tool)

Author: Manu Steens

The situation today with interstate armed conflict (war, proxy wars)

I feel the world is approaching a tipping point. Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and now, after almost 3 years, has not reached its goal. North Korea is acting tough against South Korea and began a massive recruitment of soldiers for its army. North Korea is also lending soldiers to Russia in Ukraine, so they can gain war experience. The nature of war is changing, including massive use of drones and missiles, which no one can hide from. Rutte, the new “boss of NATO,” warns that we must seriously arm against war ourselves. Governments make it clear to citizens that they can’t vouch for everything and talk about what you can do yourself. But what are the social, technical and political issues that might occur?

Social implications of interstate armed conflict:

The world wars best known in the EU by average citizens are those of Ukraine, Gaza and the interventions in Syria, although the latter is not a purely interstate war. The main social implications divide among the affected social cohesion, refugees, mental health and social solidarity. I discuss these separately here. However, there may be overlap.

Social Cohesion:

In the present (Gaza) we see strong tensions between different ethnic and religious groups. Thus, Israel is not only attacking Gaza, but it seems they are taking this fight to the rest of the world as well, with hundreds of attacks in Syria in addition to the killing of an Iranian general. In Ukraine, meanwhile, ethnic Ukrainians continue to fight the Russians. The latter has been identified as the largest proxy war to date.

One weapon is the polarization in societies over support for conflict parties. In doing so, all sides pull the sheet to themselves. Opinions are also divided about the war in Ukraine. So too in Ukraine itself.

In doing so, risk of discrimination against minorities associated with conflict parties occurs. Such as Jews who want to have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza, who are targeted in other countries. But discrimination is also beginning to emerge in EU countries.

In the process, an uneven distribution of the burden of the conflict occurs. All the billions of dollars and Euros that the USA and others lent to Ukraine for purchase of weapons systems. Who will (be able to) repay those loans? Either large sums will be forgiven. Either Ukrainian citizens of the future will be heavily taxed, or Ukraine will have to file for bankruptcy. In the process, Ukraine can then be “sold” to the highest bidder. None of these solutions will be positive for social cohesion.

Refugees and Migration:

Large-scale refugee flows were triggered during Ukraine’s war and received in the EU. These put a lot of pressure on reception systems and the health system of host countries.

In the process, integration challenges occur in host countries. At home, people continue to speak the language of the country of origin. Moreover, in several EU countries the teaching profession is now no longer popular. The children of refugees cannot keep up with their peers due to language deficiencies. But, there are some refugees who roll up their sleeves, filling bottleneck jobs. Or learn the language against all odds, and manage to get their diploma. With that, they go to work locally.

There is also abuse of the system by some. This produces social tensions around shelter and distribution of resources. This is accompanied by impact on local institutions that provide support to those in need.

Mental Health:

Traditionally known are collective trauma and anxiety in society and post-traumatic stress in veterans and in refugees. However, there is more. Psychological impact on children and adolescents occurs more than we think. Not just for refugees, but for anyone who comes in contact with images of extreme violence on social media. Because of all this, there is an increase in the need for psychosocial care. So bottleneck occupations will increase in psychological care.

A large number of mental problems are similar to those associated with intrastate violence. A number of physical and longer-term health problems were also discussed there.

Social Solidarity:

The war in Ukraine has provided an unprecedented new form of social support and assistance through massive temporary protection in EU countries. In Flanders, ‘reception centers‘ were even organized. Of course, this also produced tensions due to the duality between solidarity and self-interest.

There were also changing perceptions of “friend” and “enemy”: where many Germans still felt guilt over WWII, they now clearly made friends with a number of countries with Slavic populations. There came through the war a clear view of how the NATO countries impact international understanding and cooperation. Governments are also taking care to educate society into a more resilient population. A first step in doing so are calls  for self-reliance. This includes a call for a survival kit, including a list of what all belongs in it. This with the idea that the population should not turn en masse into preppers.

The reason for preparation is not always told, but once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia can completely switch its economy to a war economy and can transform and strengthen its military. The result is a strengthening of the threat to NATO countries.

Technical implications of interstate armed conflict:

Military technology is evolving super-fast. Cyber security is an absolute must in this regard. Industrial capabilities and communications technologies are also important, and the perennial energy issue as well as infrastructure around energy and communications. All these matters of technological requirements and sources of problems point to a need for more focus on strategic technological autonomy. International cooperation and competition in dual-use technology development within NATO countries is worth an economic boost.

Military Technology:

When one must, one can do more. So accelerated development of new weapons systems is an almost logical consequence. After all, the economy then switches to a war economy, and that includes innovation. One not only wants better weapons than the opponent, one also wants to answer the weapons of the opponent with new systems. These must render the enemy’s weapons useless in an attack. For example, satellites. To do this, one will therefore increasingly use autonomous systems and artificial intelligence in warfare, with all its dangers.

Confidence in those systems is needed. But they must earn it. For such systems must “learn”, and that learning time is never finished, as has been demonstrated in the peaceable technology of self-driving cars, or even just the self-driving braking systems in electric cars, which may miss the stationary truck in front of your wheels due to, say, an oblique incident light. An example of such a response by Russia to NATO’s anti-missile systems are the incredibly fast missiles that can no longer be easily intercepted. Therefore, the West will have to use other techniques.

One idea in evolution is to employ lasers as weapons. If one could succeed in building up such laser potential in space, one could neutralize attacks from the beginning of aggression on the aggressor’s own territory. The growing importance of space and satellite technology for military purposes is then obvious. People are already developing space as a military domain in the USA.

Hybrid warfare

Shift to hybrid warfare has also evolved with this. One can apply economic, political, disinformation and cyber-attacks to weaken the opponent before committing a physical attack. Economic attacks include trade wars with taxes levied on imports, as well as banning exports to other countries, such as with high-tech equipment that may not be sold to China, or commodities that one no longer purchases from Russia, or sells to Russia. As a result, shortages occur, or industries are affected. Politically, one can take sides with the warring party one sympathizes with, by allowing loans, or selling or gifting weapons. Or freezing or depriving of opponents assets.

Disinformation is a weapon that can affect civilians when they place faith in it, such as faith in the opponent’s clout. But what must certainly be guarded against in the future is the power of cyber. This can be on several levels. Cyber is powerful and cyber is vulnerable. With AI and the experience we are gaining in self-directed systems, along with Drone technology, the day is not far when we develop a sort of “Terminator” machine. These will surpass humans on the battlefield in speed and effectiveness. But if based on IT, the temptation is that the opponent can hack it, and thus use it against its owner.

Cybersecurity:

Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure will increase, as long as they are not destroyed with “classical” weapons. What qualifies as critical infrastructure in this regard is largely determined for the EU by the NIS2 directive. In my opinion, in a longer-term war, it is also useful to consider schools as critical infrastructure. We see this reasoning practiced by Israel in Gaza. Israel thereby seeks to maximize its own profits in any warfare by keeping the potential enemy stupid on its own border.

This proves the absolute need to strengthen one’s own digital attack and defense systems against outside attacks. This involves innovation, and thus the development of advanced cyber weapons and countermeasures.

To vouch for that security, the GDPR has a special clause: in times of emergency, when national security is at stake, privacy laws can sometimes be set aside. And this is already allowed in peacetime, when the need is clear. So impact on privacy and digital freedoms through increased surveillance can occur quickly. In the name of everyone’s security.

Industrial Capacity:

Reorienting industry toward defense production is part of the answer. Personally, I would encourage technological innovation that can be deployed dually (both civilian and military). An example is the GPS system used daily by billions of people. That non-ordinary products are useful and necessary in this regard is obvious. Rare earths, for example, are needed to develop new technologies. A trade war can rage over this when the opponent tries to monopolize it. Rare earths are used to produce rare technological components. Pressure on supply chains for critical components and rare materials will thus increase as one works to develop weapons systems for a future war. A scientific advantage is accelerated innovation in materials science and production processes. But a disadvantage then again is that these may often become trade secrets.

Communication Technology:

A separate nerve point is communications technology. The development of more secure communications systems is a must-be if military orders are to be transmitted securely. Here again, the war in Ukraine has shown both sides the weaknesses of the use and associated traceability of ordinary smartphones and tablets. The opponent, by properly monitoring GSM signals, can detect the location of enemy troops, and adjust his tactics on the battlefield accordingly. Encryption techniques and other security technologies will be necessary to secure military discussions over networks, public and otherwise.

Communication technologies include methods suitable for information warfare and counter-propaganda. Disinformation, as cited earlier, is a big part of this. But here, too, AI will prove useful.

Energy and infrastructure:

As known, the first thing one needs technically to create or restore something, keep society running or get it going again, is energy and all its ancillary and other useful infrastructure. So to be prepared for war, one has to start thinking about developing resilient energy systems and technical measures to protect critical infrastructure. NIS2 is an example of this with respect to cyber security. In addition, energy must also be able to be stored and distributed. To this end, the increase in knowledge of batteries is an advantage, but not yet sufficiently advanced.

In addition to energy, society is very much in need of communication in times of war. Reinforcement of communication networks against disruptions of all kinds (causing e.g. electricity blackouts) is thus an absolute necessity. In this regard, the vulnerable infrastructure of Western Europe is insufficiently equipped with backup systems to provide a resilient response. The first network designed for this purpose was the Internet. However, there could also be a need for massive satellite telephony. Especially when hackers and “whipers” flood the Internet.

Political Implications of Interstate Armed Conflict:

Political implications are multifaceted. I briefly cite here a non-exhaustive number, which I can only elaborate incompletely. Namely, global power relations, collateral economic impact, European security architecture, regional stability and democratic values.

Global Power Relations:

Because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the threat perception toward other countries, a number of countries decided to join NATO. This made NATO stronger, and this forces Russia to expand its border surveillance. This spreads the forces of the Russian military.

Also, a strong contact has developed between North Korea, China, Iran and Russia in terms of international arms trade. A large number of countries have expressed positive views on the BRICs currency, preceded by the Chinese renminbi. The intention is to form an equivalent to the dollar and the Euro.

Economic Impact:

Europe and the USA banned some trade relations with Russia. USA and EU governments whistled back organizations with a foothold in Russia. Preliminary unknowns destroyed a gas supply chain. Other supply chains were diverted. Organizations had to suspend trade relations. Partly as a result, new trading blocs and economic corridors emerged. Prices of energy and commodities went the volatile way, prompting political attempts to stabilize them.

The USA put its finger on the problem regarding the insufficient defense spending of some NATO countries. Those countries will increase defense spending back, putting pressure on other government spending.

European Security Architecture:

The situation of the war in Ukraine caused a rethinking of European defense capabilities and EU strategic autonomy within NATO and the world. It was widely recognized that strengthening NATO as a collective security system is useful and necessary. The question is whether NATO will also change in its nature as a defense system. Especially on a technical level then because with current technical developments so much more is possible than a battle of man against man.

The expansion of NATO was the first step of increasing unity in response to the need for unity in Europe. Also of European unity in foreign and security policy. With NATO expansion, there is going to be more need of “us working together with us”. However, there are also voices wondering what the world would look like without NATO.

Overall, there is a growing focus on hybrid threats and cyber warfare. That alone in itself is reason enough in my view to close the ranks of NATO and the European Union. To develop knowledge together, and systematically increase the baseline of NATO’s capabilities.

Regional Stability:

Depending on how the war develops, there will be influence from the war zones to safer regions in the EU. In the process, refugee flows may increase again. Terrorist threats may increase and change in nature. Regions may feel obliged to overarm and reinstate army service where it is not currently mandatory. This could trigger a downward spiral on peace talks. But also a positive one is possible.

Democratic Values:

Due to disinformation, political, economic and philosophical divisions and therefore divisions within the population, polarization is evident. So too in higher political circles. Military pressure translates politically and puts pressure on civil liberties through security measures, as will inevitably occur should Russia’s war with Ukraine come to an end. Democracy includes the responsibility to protect one’s collective rights. Along with that idea, NATO was built. From a political point of view, that gives an important twist, namely, although we are a democracy, freedoms become less absolute. As we learn from history, it is thereby the task of politics to correctly address risk of authoritarian tendencies in times of crisis and war so that these tendencies cannot escalate.